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Steven E. Merlis*
¶1

¶2

As society advances and each generation is presented with new technology,
problems inevitably follow from such technological advances. The Internet provides
society with an infinite source of ideas and expression.1 Unfortunately, the freedom and
unregulated nature of the Internet also produces serious problems. One of the biggest
problems created by the Internet is the potentially negative effect it can have on children.2
As children explore the Internet, they are often bombarded with sexually indecent
websites that may be damaging to the children’s interests.3 Politicians, industry leaders,
and parents have identified this risk and have devised solutions to protect children from
the evils they believe lurk on sexually explicit websites. Arguably, Congress took the
largest step to control this problem through its passage of the Child Online Protection Act
(“COPA”) in 1998.4 However, in June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court declared COPA
unconstitutional, finding that COPA trampled on the freedom of expression granted by
the First Amendment.5 The interplay between Congress and the Supreme Court
regarding COPA exemplifies the complex battle raging throughout America as society
tries to balance the right to freely communicate through the Internet with society’s
responsibility to look out for the best interest of its youth. This paper describes the
conflict between freedom of expression on the Internet and the protection of children.
Part I addresses the nature of the Internet and why this major conflict between First
Amendment expression and protection of children exists. Part II of this paper discusses
the laws Congress passed to address this problem, particularly the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”) and COPA. This Part focuses on why those laws failed to pass
the Supreme Court’s test of constitutionality. Finally, Part III describes various options
available to combat the transmission of indecent material to minors, keeping in mind the
important First Amendment concerns. This section proposes that the most effective

*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2006, Northwestern University School of Law.
1
Comm’n on Child Online Protection, Report to Congress 7, 11 (2000) [hereinafter Commission],
available at http://www.copacommission.org/report/COPAreport.pdf.
2
Id. at 11.
3
Namita E. Mani, Legal Update: Judicial Scrutiny of Congressional Attempts to Protect Children from
the Internet’s Harms: Will Filtering Technology Provide the Answer Congress Has Been Looking For?, 9
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 201, 202 (2003).
4
Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
5
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004).
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solution combines a variety of approaches, and that no single law or piece of technology
is sufficient to cure the problem.
I.
¶3

¶4

¶5

¶6

THE INEVITABLE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUALLY INDECENT MATERIAL

What makes technological advances so exciting is also what sometimes makes
them dangerous. The surprisingly quick manner that technology sweeps into society and
changes our lives is normally caused in part by society’s lack of preparation for the
specific advancements. This lack of preparation that makes these technological
advancements exciting also lessens society’s ability to fully control the effects of
technology, both good and bad.
Our political, social, and economic structures fail to alleviate the problems that
stem from technological advancements because of our inability to predict what problems
may stem from unknown and untested technology.6 For example, the availability of
automobiles in the twentieth century blessed America with the opportunity to travel and
explore the country. Unfortunately, the advantages that automobiles afforded our society
created lasting negative effects: overextension, sprawl, and environmental damage.
The advancement of the Internet represents a more recent technological innovation
with potentially unlimited benefits for humankind that also carries serious negative side
effects.7 The Internet exploded into Americans’ lives throughout the 1990s, bringing
with it a resource unlimited in potential.8 The Internet revolutionized how America gets
its news, shops, communicates with family and friends, and checks the morning sports
scores.9 It has also been an amazing boon to business, allowing rapid communication and
creating a global market for products previously advertised to a limited few.10 All in all,
the Internet has become a vast source of expression, with people all across the world able
to communicate their unique ideas to anyone with a computer.11 Likewise, the
decentralized nature of the Internet helps avoid the problem of single sources of power
dictating what communications the masses receive.12
The creation of large numbers of sexually explicit websites stands as one particular
development stemming from the freedom and unconstrained environment of the Internet.
These websites abound all throughout the Internet and can be easily accessed by any
interested party, including children.13 Moreover, some aggressive members of the online
pornographic community trick people into accessing their pornographic sites.14 Thus,
children inadvertently encounter pornographic sites when casually surfing the Internet for
6

See Melanie L. Hersh, Is COPPA a Cop Out? The Child Online Privacy Protection Act as Proof that
Parents, Not Government, Should Be Protecting Children’s Interests on the Internet, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1831, 1844 (2001) (technology moves faster then legislation).
7
Commission, supra note 1, at 11.
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
See id.
11
A.C.L.U. v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 2000).
12
Commission, supra note 1, at 13.
13
See id.
14
Russell B. Weekes, Cyber Zoning a Mature Domain: The Solution to Preventing Inadvertent Access
to Sexually Explicit Content on the Internet?, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2003).
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acceptable purposes related to school work or entertainment.15 Whether it is voluntary or
involuntary, children all across the country come across pornographic material on the
Internet, some of which may damage their well-being.16
Much of society views this as a serious problem that requires immediate action;
therefore, many segments of society try to shield society’s children from this material.17
Unfortunately, many of the attempts to keep this indecent material away from children
directly conflict with the First Amendment.18 While protecting our children remains an
important goal, the ways that society tries to accomplish this goal must accord with the
individual’s right to express himself or herself, and the right to receive other parties’
expressions.
Unfortunately, Congress’s most recent attempts to protect children minimized the
freedoms granted by the First Amendment. That forced the Supreme Court to invalidate
these laws designed to protect children from sexually indecent material on the Internet.19
II. CONGRESS’ FAILED ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE SEXUALLY INDECENT MATERIAL ON THE
INTERNET

¶9

To eliminate the potentially damaging effect of Internet pornography on children,
Congress tried multiple times to regulate sexually explicit material transmitted over the
Internet.20 Congress’ first major attempt at suppressing sexually explicit material began
in 1996 with the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).21 Two years after its passage,
the Supreme Court declared the CDA unconstitutional based on its adverse impact on
First Amendment rights.22 Following on the heels of the CDA came the Child Online
Protection Act (“COPA”), a law with the same objectives as the CDA, but with narrower
construction designed to meet the constitutional concerns raised by the Supreme Court in
its rejection of the CDA.23 Once again, the Supreme Court declared this law
unconstitutional because of its adverse effect on First Amendment rights.24 Clearly, the
Court made a point that the First Amendment will not be sacrificed even in the face of
legislation designed to benefit America’s children. The following analysis of both pieces
of legislation outlines the constitutional parameters the government must work within
when crafting legislation on this issue.

15

Id.
Rebecca L. Covell, Problems with Government Regulation of the Internet: Adjusting the Court’s
Level of First Amendment Scrutiny, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 778 (2000) (“[W]hen children are forced to view
pornography, it can be harmful to their natural sexual development, resulting in distorted beliefs about
human sexuality.”) (emphasis added).
17
See Commission, supra note 1, at 11.
18
Id.
19
Mani, supra note 3, at 202.
20
Dawn S. Conrad, Protecting Children from Pornography on the Internet: Freedom of Speech is
Pitching and Congress May Strike Out, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2002-2003).
21
47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
22
Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
23
47 U.S.C. § 231.
24
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004).
16
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A. The Communications Decency Act
¶10

¶11

¶12
¶13

¶14

In response to a growing concern that America’s children were being inundated
with sexually indecent material through the Internet, Congress responded with the
CDA.25 This legislation created criminal punishments for publishers who transmitted
“‘obscene or indecent’ communications to any recipient under 18 years of age,” or who
displayed in a manner available “to a person under 18 years of age, communications that,
in context, depict or describe, in terms ‘patently offensive’ as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”26 Immediately following
its adoption into law, various parties challenged the law’s constitutionality, and the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a
preliminary injunction stalling the CDA’s inception.27 Eventually, the case, made its way
to the Supreme Court, wherein the Court found the CDA unconstitutional based on its
chilling effect on the First Amendment.28
In deciding this case, Justice Stevens explained that the First Amendment protects
non-obscene communications over the Internet.29 Therefore, an attempt to infringe this
liberty must withstand the test of strict scrutiny—the constitutional test given to most
legislation that threatens to limit First Amendment freedoms.30 To survive strict scrutiny,
the government must demonstrate that the law serves a compelling governmental interest
and is narrowly tailored to meet the objectives of this interest.31
To the Court, the CDA had the potential to substantially restrain protected speech if
the law went into effect.32 Beginning from that premise, the government faced the
difficult task of showing that the CDA passed strict scrutiny.
In the Court’s opinion, the CDA met the first part of the test: serving a compelling
governmental interest. Protecting America’s youth from potentially damaging indecent
material on the Internet presented a serious enough matter for Congress to restrict the
First Amendment rights of Internet users.33 However, the application of the second half
of the strict scrutiny test proved to be the downfall for the CDA.34 The Court found that
the CDA was overly broad and was not narrowly-tailored enough to meet its goals.35
To begin with, the Court found that “the many ambiguities concerning the scope of
[the CDA’s] coverage” attest to its overly broad nature.36 The law’s use of the words
“indecent” and “patently offensive” to describe what type of communications would be
punishable was seen by the Court as too vague a description for Internet users to rely on
when making sure their communications stay in line with the CDA.37 The law failed to
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
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47 U.S.C. § 223.
Id. at § 223(d).
A.C.L.U. v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
Id. at 874.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 871.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
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define either set of words, nor did the law make any attempt to distinguish them for the
purposes of the statute.38 The statute also failed to indicate “whether ‘patently offensive’
and ‘indecent’ determinations should be made with respect to minors or the population as
a whole.”39 The vague definitions created a scenario where courts across the country
might inconsistently rule on the illegality of similar communications. This
unpredictability would lead to a chilling effect on people’s expressions through the
Internet since the CDA imposed criminal punishments.40 The Court viewed this
“uncertainty” as evidence that the statute was not “carefully tailored to the Congressional
Goal.”41
¶15
Stevens then declared that the CDA failed the strict scrutiny test because it
“suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and
to address to one another.”42 The right to receive speech must not fall by the wayside as
Congress crafts laws to protect children, particularly if “less restrictive alternatives are
available.”43
¶16
The Court also found the CDA overbroad because of its applicability to
noncommercial websites.44 This broad definition had the potential to suppress speech
from many nonprofits dedicated to promoting sexual health or displaying beautiful
artwork because certain segments of society find this educational material “indecent” or
“patently offensive.”45 Certainly, the potential suppression of this valuable speech
exceeds the compelling interest of protecting children from vile pornographers.
¶17
Finally, the Court found inadequate the affirmative defenses (such as the use of age
verification devices) provided by the CDA for website publishers who display sexual or
other unprotected content.46 The Court found it infeasible for many website publishers to
use age verification devices because of their expense and their imprecision in determining
ages.47 In essence, these defenses failed to provide publishers with outlets for unfettered
expression across the Internet. Therefore, the CDA was shown once again to be overly
broad and too great an infringement on the First Amendment.48
B. The Child Online Protection Act
¶18

Following the devastating failure of the CDA, Congress crafted COPA in response
to the constitutional deficiencies the Court found in the CDA. COPA set forth a more
specific test than the CDA to determine if transmitted material was “harmful to a minor”
and therefore illegal and punishable as a crime.49 Indeed, COPA was more narrowly
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Reno, 521 U.S. at 871.
Id. at 871 & n.37.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 874.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id. at 881-82.
Id.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 881-82..
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000):
The term ‘material that is harmful to minors’ means any communication, picture, image, graphic
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tailored than the CDA; however, the massive infringement on the First Amendment
created by COPA once again forced the Court to declare Congress’ law
unconstitutional.50
¶19
Directly after its inception, a judge from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania enjoined COPA.51 COPA then traveled to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court, then back to the court
of appeals, and then back to the Supreme Court before finally being decided.52
¶20
On COPA’s initial trip to the court of appeals, the court upheld the district court’s
injunction but with a different reasoning. The court of appeals found that COPA’s use of
a community standard to determine what is “harmful to minors” deprived too large of a
segment of America’s population from accessing protected speech.53 The court of
appeals noted the uniqueness of the Internet as a form of communication; specifically,
that anyone with access to the Internet may receive materials published on the web.54
Thus, a publisher may not put something on the web but then selectively restrict its
access to those geographic communities that would be most receptive to the
communication. Therefore, a community standard approach to defining what material is
“harmful to minors” could be set by any community in the United States, including the
most conservative communities.55 In order to avoid punishments under COPA many
publishers might restrict their communications to material satisfactory to the most
conservative communities.56 The court of appeals found that this chilling effect on
publishers would subsequently limit the amount and type of constitutionally protected
speech available to adult recipients.57 In sum, the concern that conservative communities
would wield too much power and would too easily control the speech of this country
forced the court of appeals to declare COPA unconstitutional.
¶21
The case then traveled to the Supreme Court, where the Court found that COPA’s
use of a “contemporary community” standard did not make the statute overbroad and thus
image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that—
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the
material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander
to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an
actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted
sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors
50
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 706 (2004).
51
A.C.L.U. v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (the court enjoined the implementation of
COPA because “blocking or filtering technology may be at least as successful as COPA would be in
restricting minors’ access to harmful material online without imposing the burden on constitutionally
protected speech that COPA imposes on adult users or Web site operators. Such a factual conclusion is at
least some evidence that COPA does not employ the least restrictive means”).
52
Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 700.
53
A.C.L.U. v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2000) (the court declared that “[t]he overbreadth of
COPA’s definition of ‘harmful to minors’ applying a ‘contemporary community standards’ clause . . . so
concerns us that we are persuaded that this aspect of COPA, without reference to its provisions, must lead
inexorably to a holding of a likelihood of unconstitutionality of the entire COPA statute’”).
54
Id. at 176.
55
Id. at 177.
56
Id.
57
Id.
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unconstitutional.58 The Court noted that Congress drafted COPA to make its “harmful to
minors” element parallel a part of the definition of legally obscene speech laid out by the
Court in Miller v. California.59 In Miller, the Court found it appropriate to use a
community standards test to determine if speech was legally obscene and therefore
unprotected under the First Amendment.60 Thus, in evaluating the court of appeals’
ruling, the Supreme Court found that COPA could not be declared overbroad simply
based on its use of a “community standards” test because the Court previously approved a
similar test in Miller.61 In making this determination, the Court noted that its holding was
very narrow and based on this specific issue.62 The Court remanded the case back to the
court of appeals for another review of COPA’s constitutionality (aside from the
community standards issue).63
¶22
The court of appeals declared COPA unconstitutionally overbroad after hearing the
case the second time.64 In applying strict scrutiny to COPA, the Court found that COPA
served the compelling governmental interest of “protecting minors from material
online.”65 However, the Court found that COPA failed the second part of the strict
scrutiny test because it was not “narrowly tailored.”66 Declaring that COPA failed to
pass the strict scrutiny test, the court of appeals held that the district court appropriately
used its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction against COPA.67
¶23
Hearing the case for a second time, the Supreme Court affirmed “the decision of
the Court of Appeals upholding the preliminary injunction” against COPA.68 However,
early in its decision, the Court noted that Congress crafted COPA as a response to the
Court’s invalidation of the CDA.69 In fact, the Court praised Congress for drafting the
language of COPA to compensate for the deficiencies the Court cited in the CDA.70 The
Court even made a point to note that it would take into account, when judging the
constitutionality of a law, whether Congress passed a law in accordance with the advice
and precedent of the Supreme Court.71 Still, the Court found that regardless of Congress’
attention to precedent in drafting COPA, COPA’s infringement on the First Amendment
was too substantial to find COPA constitutional.72
58

Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 535 U.S. 564, 583-84 (2002).
Id. at 584-85; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
60
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
61
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 584-85.
62
Id. at 585-86.
63
Id. at 586.
64
A.C.L.U. v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003).
65
Id. at 251.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 271.
68
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 698 (2004).
69
Id. (“In enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration to our earlier decisions on this subject, in
particular the decision in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). For that
reason, ‘the judiciary must proceed with caution and . . . with care before invalidating the Act.’ Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 592, 152 L.Ed. 2d 771, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (Ashcroft I)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)”).
70
Id.
71
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 698 (2004).
72
Id.
59
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When getting into the meat of its decision, the court focused on the issue of
whether or not Congress narrowly tailored COPA enough to meet the compelling interest
of protecting children while also maintaining the sanctity of the First Amendment.73
Justice Kennedy’s opinion held that alternatives to COPA existed that would have been
just as, if not more, effective in protecting children from indecent material on the
Internet, and that would be less disruptive to rights of expression.74
¶25
The Court suggested a variety of less restrictive alternatives. Filtering software
(strongly recommended by the district court) stood out to the Court as an equally
effective yet less restrictive alternative.75 Justice Kennedy explained how filters allow
individuals to control what they access on the Internet while maintaining the ability of
publishers to communicate whatever they wish. As Justice Kennedy noted: “Filters are
less restrictive than COPA. They impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving
end, not universal restrictions at the source.”76 The Court also found that filters protected
children from indecent material, while still providing adults, including parents, the ability
to access the Internet’s infinite amount of speech simply by turning off their filter.77
Justice Kennedy also noted that the use of filters prevented the need to criminalize
speech; a notion that stood in contrast to the basic premise of COPA.78 Ensuring that
individuals would not be punished for their speech guaranteed that there would not be a
chilling effect on publishers’ speech as there would be with COPA. By eliminating the
potential for a chilling effect, the filter prevailed as a more effective and reasoned
alternative.
¶26
The Court then argued that filters might protect children from sexually indecent
material more so than COPA.79 Filters keep out pornography from overseas websites,
whereas the United States would lack jurisdiction to prosecute foreign pornographers
under COPA.80 Also, filters prevent the influx of indecent speech from “all forms of
Internet communications, including email,” instant messaging, and the entire World Wide
Web. On the other hand, COPA applied only to communications published on the World
Wide Web.81
¶27
The Court then described why the affirmative defenses created to protect children
—while helping website owners avoid liability—would not protect children from
indecent material.82 Using age-verification technology to limit website access would not
prevent children from maneuvering around the technology and accessing indecent sites.83
In fact, “the District Court found that verification systems may be subject to evasion and
circumvention, for example by minors who have their own credit cards.”84 Moreover, the
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
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Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 702 (2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 702 (2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Court’s most substantial critique of the age-verification defense emerges from Justice
Kennedy’s reference to the “Commission on Child Online Protection, a blue-ribbon
commission created by Congress in COPA itself.”85 Congress charged this Commission
to evaluate a variety of options designed to protect minors from indecent material
transmitted over the Internet. Justice Kennedy notes that this Commission
“unambiguously found that filters are more effective than age-verification
requirements.”86
¶28
After looking at the promising option of Internet filters and the deficiencies of the
age verification system proposed by COPA, the Supreme Court held that sufficient
evidence existed to support the district court’s injunction of COPA.87 Therefore, the
Court temporarily upheld the injunction.88 However, the Court found that the factual
circumstances that led the district court to its initial decision might have significantly
changed since the time the case was initially heard in 1999; therefore, the Court
instructed the district court to decide the case again based on any new technological
information.89 However, by the end of the opinion, the Court’s instructions read as a
whole give the appearance that the Court thinks narrower alternatives exist and the
district court should once again issue an injunction.90 Because the Supreme Court
essentially declared the CDA and COPA unconstitutional, it appears that actors outside of
Congress will need to pursue the goal of protecting children from indecent content on the
Internet.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO COPA – WHAT IS OUT THERE THAT CAN PROTECT OUR CHILDREN?
¶29

While the fall of COPA reaffirms our country’s commitment to the First
Amendment, the decision has a number of negative consequences. To begin with,
America is left wondering how to protect its children from the dangers of indecent
material online. Congress’ two major attempts to help protect children from sexually
improper material both failed. Currently, it appears that a solution to protect children
from the dangers of the Internet will not be found in a wide-sweeping piece of legislation
implemented by Congress; precedent dictates that the Court will rule against anything
that abridges the First Amendment and is not narrowly tailored. Therefore, society
should look at other options to find a way to protect children while maintaining the
integrity of the First Amendment.
¶30
This section of the paper evaluates various methods to protect children from
indecent Internet material. In particular, this section discusses the use of filtering
software and various approaches to cyber zoning. Although none of these solutions will

85

Id.
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 702 (2004).
87
Id. at 704.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Kennedy’s references to the new types of evidence that might be available are all references to
evidence that would be beneficial to opponents of COPA, such as the COPA report detailing the benefits of
filtering software.
86
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solve the problem alone, a mixture of these methods offers a good chance of protecting
children while preserving the First Amendment.91
A. Filtering Software
¶31

The use of filtering software to protect children from indecent material on the
Internet is a popular solution. On an abstract level, the use of filters stands as an effective
option to protect children. In theory, filters allow publishers to put whatever they want
on the Internet (thus preserving their First Amendment rights) while allowing parents to
selectively choose what Internet material they want their children to see (protecting
children). As Justice Kennedy wrote, filters “impose selective restrictions on speech at
the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source.”92
¶32
Therefore, publishers may publish whatever they want. Their speech would not be
chilled, for they would hold no fear of being prosecuted for criminal violations. In
addition, parents could set filters to block the specific types of material that they want
their children to avoid. This seems more desirable than having the government decide,
across-the-board, what content children may receive. As one commentator noted (while
making a reference to the “community standards” provision of COPA), “[T]he smallest
community every American belongs to is their household or family community. It is this
community that in the end should be the deciding force on what is viewed . . . not a
nameless, faceless group deciding an artificial standard that will subject the entire nation
to their attitudes.”93 Filters may bring this statement to life.
¶33
Furthermore, the Internet provides children with a wealth of valuable educational
information that helps them develop into adults.94 The Internet supplies children and
teenagers with information on sexual education, the reality of drug use, and information
on relationships.95 The Internet helps children learn about these sensitive topics because
some children remain fearful or shy about discussing these issues with their parents. The
use of filters allows children to access more of this material while not encountering
potentially damaging sexually explicit material.96
¶34
An important study completed by the Kaiser Family Foundation (“KFF”) found
that, if used properly, filters could be very effective at restricting minors’ access to
indecent websites while allowing minors to access important educational websites.97
This stands in contrast to the methods of COPA that had the possibility of chilling not
just sexually indecent speech, but also speech relating to sexual health and sexual
education. Furthermore, the KFF report noted that using filters at their least restrictive
setting brought about the best balance.98 It concluded that “at the least restrictive or
91

Commission, supra note 1, at 9.
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 696 (2004).
93
Kristin Ringeisen, Recent Decision: The Use of Community Standards by the Child Online Protection
Act to Determine if Material is Harmful to Minors Is not Unconstitutional: Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 449, 465 (2003).
94
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, See No Evil: How Internet Filters Affect the Search for Online
Health Information, Executive Summary, at 3 (2002).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 6.
98
Id.
92
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intermediate configurations, the filters tested do not block a substantial proportion of
general health information sites; however, at the most restrictive configuration, one in
four health sites are blocked.”99 The report then explained that “while using a more
restrictive setting for the filters results in a significant increase in blocking of health sites,
it yields only a marginal increase in effectiveness at blocking pornography.”100 This
study seems to imply that filters could delicately balance First Amendment concerns of
access to educational information with society’s interest in protecting its youth.
¶35
While support exists for filters, this technology is not without flaws.101 The most
commonly cited problem with filters is their tendency to be over-inclusive or underinclusive.102 Filters are under-inclusive when they do not block indecent websites.
Filters are over-inclusive when they block websites that are not indecent. Underinclusion occurs when filtering software relies on pre-established lists to filter out
indecent websites.103 These lists become dated quickly unless the user of the filtering
program constantly updates the software.104 Filtering software also may fail to block
websites that consist mainly of indecent images without text.105 For the most part, filters
work through an analysis of text; therefore, websites with pictures but no text sometimes
sneak through a filter’s grip.106
¶36
Over-inclusion normally occurs through a filtering program’s standardized manner
of declaring websites indecent based on individual words in the text.107 Unfortunately,
since filters cannot detect the meaning of text or nuanced language, filters sometimes
block educational websites containing words typically associated with indecent
99
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publications.108 Over-inclusion also occurs because some filter manufacturers make sure
that their filters preference over-inclusion. For example, “[b]ecause most filters are
deployed to forestall complaints, and complaints are more likely to be received about
underblocking rather than overblocking, filter vendors have more incentive to block
content that may be controversial than to be careful about not blocking content that
should not be blocked.”109
¶37
Overblocking raises serious First Amendment concerns, particularly since the
algorithms that power these filters remain undisclosed to the public because of business
competition reasons.110 Filtering software that fails to provide its users the type of
protected speech they want could lead to a degradation of the First Amendment.111
Indeed, when the government mandates filters in public settings (such as public libraries)
significant censorship issues arise.112 However, this argument against filters fails to
apply to filters voluntarily used in private homes. Parents hold the power to control their
filters, and if they encounter any unpalatable restraints on expression, they can adjust the
filters or remove the filters altogether.
¶38
The serious problems with filters do not stem from their effect on the First
Amendment. Rather, the lack of protection filters sometimes provide remains the
greatest problem. As previously mentioned, filters oftentimes underblock indecent
websites for one reason or another. As noted in a criticism to the KFF study, “the filters
failed to work 10% of the time – one out of ten (1 in 10) sites. Consider how long it
would take a curious teen or a staff member at an unsupervised computer to check out ten
blocked sites to find the one that is unblocked.”113 In essence, with an infinite number of
websites devoted to pornography, it is only a matter of time before children find
unblocked pornographic sites, thereby rendering filtering software ineffective.
¶39
In addition, the high level of computer literacy of children allows them to bypass
filters through tricks that go undetected by their less computer savvy parents.114 Filters
also prove ineffective when children access computers outside their homes, particularly at
108
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friends’ homes.115 Furthermore, the existence and the benefits of filters remain unknown
to many parents.116
¶40
Overall, filtering software presents a promising method for suppressing children’s
access to indecent pornographic material on the Internet. The imprecision of filters and
the ability of children to bypass their parents’ installation of the filters constitute definite
downsides. But parents who stay up-to-date with their filtering programs and update
their software likely will find that filters substantially deter their children from accessing
pornography. Also, as parents familiarize themselves with the benefits of filters, possibly
through publicly funded education campaigns, the everyday use of filters in homes might
grow in popularity. As filtering technology continues to improve, this software will only
increase in importance as a tool to balance the interests of Internet expression and the
protection of children.
¶41
In crafting solutions for this problem, commentators tend to call for comprehensive
and balanced solutions. Similarly, this paper argues that filtering technology should be
the major method for protecting children from indecent material, while a number of other
methods should serve as complements.
B. Cyber Zoning
¶42

Cyber-zoning should complement filtering software in the attempt to balance the
First Amendment with the protection of America’s children. Creating a new domain
name for websites with adult material might stop children from accessing sites intended
for adults; moreover, creating a domain name for websites with children’s material might
promote the construction of an entire Internet universe dedicated to minors.117
¶43
Congress already passed a bill setting up a second level “.kids” domain.118 This
domain only includes websites directed towards the interests of children and which are
not “harmful to minors.”119 Through time this law will beneficially impact society, and
in particular America’s children. This domain has the potential to be the only area that
children need to access for their Internet needs. This area could provide children with
entertainment, education, and games. Moreover, companies such as Disney certainly will
utilize an area of the Internet where their products and programming will be wellreceived.120 Through basic supply and demand, publishers will push kid-friendly
materials of high quality, and children will surf through this single destination with a
wide assortment of interesting and healthy websites. In sum, there is no reason this
domain could not develop into something substantial.121
¶44
Unfortunately, only young children might feel the positive effects of this domain.122
Even Justice Kennedy, in his praise of the domain, noted that the domain and the material

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Conrad, supra note 20, at 7.
Id.
Commission, supra note 1, at 28-30.
47 U.S.C. § 941 (2000).
Id.
Saunders, supra note 105, at 257.
Youth, supra note 103, at § 13.2.8.
Weekes, supra note 14, at 4.

129

NORT HW EST ERN JOU RNA L O F T ECHN OLO GY AND IN TE LL EC TUA L PRO PER TY

¶45

¶46

¶47

¶48

¶49

[2005

found on the domain is for “minors under the age of 13.”123 The type of material that a
seven-year-old finds interesting differs from the type of information sought after by a
sixteen-year-old. While seven-year-olds research magical unicorns, sixteen-year-olds use
the Internet to learn about their sexual health.
However, assuming that sixteen and seventeen-year-old minors would not be
restricted to the “.kids” domain, the domain could substantially help in the fight to protect
children from indecent material. When used in combination with filtering software,
parents could restrict their five-year-old child’s access to the “.kids” domain, and
therefore, prevent their child from seeking out or inadvertently encountering indecent
websites. 124 Moreover, something just as beneficial that this domain may provide is an
increased sense of autonomy among young children. By trusting the combination of
filters and the domain, parents could grant their children more freedom to roam around
the Internet unaccompanied.125
The establishment of a mature “.xxx” domain also presents unique benefits. With a
mature domain, websites could legally publish whatever material they want, and adult
Internet users would have a central forum to explore their sexual curiosities.126
Moreover, if used in combination with a filter, parents could restrict their children’s
intentional and inadvertent access to indecent material simply by blocking the “.xxx”
domain.127
However, definite downsides exist that limit the value of such a plan, particularly if
a “.xxx” tag is required (not voluntary) for sites with indecent content. Without an
adjudicatory body to ensure the registration of adult sites, such a domain would be “only
moderately effective.”128 In such a scenario, many indecent websites would retain their
previous domain names and lurk in the general Internet, remaining accessible for
unsuspecting children. And even with an adjudicatory body that acts as an enforcement
mechanism, serious downsides remain.
To begin with, it seems improbable that an adjudicatory body could hear and
decide whether each individual website with risqué material requires a “.xxx” stamp.129
There are simply too many websites with too much content for an adjudicatory body to
make informed decisions regarding the content of every risqué website.130 Another
problem develops when websites change some of the content on their pages, i.e. an art
website that displays Dutch master painters one month and then switches to Gauguin the
next month. Would website publishers really have their websites re-evaluated each time
they change their websites?
Moreover, there would also be a practical problem regarding enforcement. Limited
government resources would only allow a limited amount of prosecution against people
who position their websites in an inappropriate domain.
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In addition, the minimization of website owners’ First Amendment rights would
stand as a large problem arising out of the creation of a mature domain. To begin with,
many website owners would prefer not to display their material on a “.xxx” domain
because it would carry a stigma.131 Website owners who display borderline indecent
materials, such as naked art or sexual health information would face the most risk.132
These individuals might not want to compromise the integrity of their materials by
throwing them onto a mature domain full of pornography. Therefore, they might be
restrained in how they use their websites to express themselves.
¶51
The implementation of a mandatory adult domain would be a poor idea for both
constitutional and practical reasons. However, a voluntary adult domain might present
some benefits. Certainly some indecent website owners would prefer to publish their
material on an adult domain.133 They might find that such a location makes it easier to
attract customers who specifically want pornography.134 All in all, a voluntary adult
domain would complement the use of filters while a mandatory adult domain would
simply be impractical and run contrary to the First Amendment.
¶52
The creation of new top level “.kids” and “.xxx” domains would serve as a boon to
parents trying to effectively use filtering technology. Parents could program the filters to
allow or disallow children from visiting certain domains. Moreover, these domains, if
used on a voluntary basis, would respect the First Amendment, and provide website
owners with a target audience to best direct their websites, products, and viewpoints.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶53

As amazing as the Internet is, serious problems associated with its rapid
introduction into our society exist. The Internet became such a vital part of Americans’
lives so quickly that legislators, parents, and the computer-technology industry failed to
adequately prepare for the problems the Internet created. The negative effect on children
from indecent sexual material transmitted over the Internet has evolved into a major
problem. Now, society must recognize this problem and develop new ways to cope with
it. In designing methods to protect children, all groups of society must recognize that any
attempt to protect children must take into account the place of the First Amendment in
American society. Previous attempts, such as Congress’ legislative adventures, CDA and
COPA, illustrate how potential solutions that ignore the First Amendment will not
receive approval from the Supreme Court.
¶54
A plan of attack that respects the First Amendment provides the best set of
solutions. Through such a plan parents would hold most of the power and responsibility
to raise and protect their children. By not allowing universal censorship of websites,
parents must individually navigate their children’s activities on the Internet. In the end,
this may result in the best scenario for every party involved. Parents will raise their
children exactly how they want, with a minimal amount of government interference.
Children will receive increased attention from their parents, and they will inherent a
unique value system instead of a universal system guided by Congress’ collective
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morals.135 The pornography industry will continue their businesses over the Internet
without fear of criminal sanctions by the government. Finally, all people will have free
reign to choose which websites they wish to access.
¶55
Parental monitoring should prevail as the major method for protecting children;
principally, this includes the use of filters and increased communication between parents
and their children. If the Supreme Court’s rejection of CDA and COPA shows anything,
it seems that the government might want to stay hands off and let parents get to work.
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Certainly, some parents do not care and will not provide enough guidance over their children’s
activities on the Internet. However, this negative consequence must be accepted in order to avoid having
Congress substantially alter the type of speech available online through overly broad content regulation.
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